HHG Part 7: The Dead Zone Backs of Fantasy's Information Age

More than any other players, how we draft these five backfields outline how the game has changed and how it stays the same. We plant our flag on who to target and who to fade.

In 1440 Johannes Gutenberg invented the Printing Press.

Gutenberg’s advancement helped set a course for the world to evolve toward its information revolution: transforming the way we interact, accumulate knowledge, and organize our societies. The reverberations of this societal transformation alter the transmission of information and social capital across new niches every day. In 2000, Brett DiCrescenzo compared Radiohead’s Kid A to a shooting star, and just a handful of years later, Pitchfork and the 21st century blog rock boom led to my 50+ year-old father telling a 9-year old Jakob Sanderson about a cool new band called Arcade Fire.

Fantasy Football is in the midst of its own information revolution. When I first started playing fantasy, you could name the core content conveyors, platforms and game types on your finger tips. But as consumer demand rose for a more explorative approach to the game, the market responded. A half-decade ago, best ball was primarily for fantasy nerds trying to hit a 20% R.O.I. on MFL10s and Draft-dot-Com. Now, it’s a market-leading tournament behemoth.

No longer is fantasy football advice the domain of platform content wings and magazines. With increased demand for content tailored to nuanced forms of fantasy football came a rise in appetite for content that meets these evolving consumers. The recent podcast between Davis Mattek and Ben Gretch on the Taek Cast hit on this.

The substackification of fantasy football has begat further branches of analysis into the most microscopic of statistical details and the most galaxy-brained strategic levers. These days, sources of level-setting fantasy football content are multiplying faster than grunge-rock indie bands post Nirvana’s Nevermind.

In 2023, the shift in transmission of content has altered how we draft. The changing attitudes toward youth, risk, role ambiguity and WR scarcity defined my first best ball articles this summer. And it’s defined the new forms of a “dead zone” running back.

Each of the five primary players discussed today stands separately from the group of traditional ‘dead-zoners’ we’ve spent the last several articles discussing as ‘fragile starters.’ They are also different from more traditional dead zone exceptions such as Jahmyr Gibbs — a rookie — and Breece Hall — an injured star.

Najee Harris is a third year back coming off two seasons spent largely as a workhorse, now available in the fourth round. Travis Etienne is entering his second NFL campaign off an extremely efficient opening to his career in a projected top offense. Ken Walker similarly produced a scintillating rookie campaign as a highly regarded prospect. JK Dobbins presents a less linear path, two years removed from his rookie breakout. But poised to reprise his lead role in an offense projected to score often, the market is pricing in significant risk with his 6th round price. Meanwhile, James Cook has virtually no college or NFL workhorse pedigree to speak of. But as an efficient, pass-catching second year player, he’s leapt into the hearts and minds of drafters and analysts across the ideological spectrum and into the heart of the “dead zone.”

There are several ways fantasy content has changed in relation to the RB position during this “information age.” But the three most present in my mind are (1) an increased focus on individual talent, (2) an increased focus on micro-utilization trends; HVTs, LDD, GL work, team-expected points etc., and (3) and increased acceptance of WR scarcity and Zero-RB-related strategies.

Just three years ago, Miles Sanders, Kenyan Drake, and Josh Jacobs spent most of the summer as R1-2 turn selections. The shift from that economy to our current one leaves drafters simultaneously disoriented and affirmed as they see the results of each of those new approaches to RB adopted, either in line with or against their own.

The saturation of new branches of content means drafters who were pre-disposed to think like you, no matter how you think, are common enough in lobbies across the world that nobody can get by drafting on heuristics alone. A critical mass has formed to buoy the ADP of every archetype of drafter’s preferred plays. As information grows, the necessity for conviction and mastery of one’s craft rises.

The opportunity cost of mid-round RBs are higher than ever, but so to is the reward. The decision you make deciphering this new form of “dead zone” running back may be the most important you make all year.

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HHG Part 7: Dead Zone Backs of Fantasy's Information Age

NOTE: all data is from the FantasyPoints Data Suite unless otherwise sourced with exception of the following: Rush Yards over Expected (RYOE) and Percentage of Rushes over Expectation (ROE%) are sourced from NFL Next Gen Stats. PFF Grades and Yards per Route Run are from PFF. BAE Rating and Relative Success Rate (RSR) are from Noah Hills. Juke Rate is from PlayerProfiler.

SEE: “Metrics Legend” at the bottom for an explanation of each stat and its acronym

The Talent Profiles

Below is my three-level chart for each of the five lead backs we’re discussing today.

Some notable context off the top:

1. JK Dobbins did not qualify for my 20-target minimum (8 targets) in 2022. He did hit my rushing attempts minimum (92) but barely. Keep this sample-size in mind when comparing to Etienne, Walker and Harris who compiled their stats across a full workload

2. James Cook missed my rushing threshold (90 carries) by one attempt, but I posted his stats anyhow. I use 90 because it’s what NFL NextGen Stats uses. Therefore, I do not have his ROE% and included an alternate RYOE/A figure from Tej Seth’s MFBAnalytics. This is a very different model that does not use in-game tracking data, and is based on a very small sample. There’s reason to take this input and all of Cook’s stats with a grain of salt as we’ll discuss in greater detail.

Travis Etienne

I’ve written about Etienne several times this off-season because the Jaguars backfield is a great proxy for a lot of the macro points I’ve been addressing this year. But I’m excited to dive deeply into him here.

The ACC’s all-time leading rusher has been perpetually misunderstood by the fantasy community, myself included.

In college, Etienne posted a 14.1% Best-Season Receiving Yards Market Share, and two seasons above 2.0 YPRR, with a best-season mark of 2.26. But his harshest film critics disputed the notion his elite college receiving production was indicative of his likely NFL receiving role. Thus far, they’ve been correct.

Etienne was efficient when thrown to last year (10.2 Yards per Reception — 2nd among backs with 20+ targets) but was rarely targeted. His TPRR ranked in the bottom quartile, and despite talk of using him all over the formation, he lined up out wide just 6.9% of the time and carried an ADOT of -0.5 (46th). He also lost LDD snaps to JaMychal Hasty over the second half of the year. He was a weapon on screen passes, and occasionally relied on as an outlet, but rarely ran a dynamic route tree. His receiving grade doesn’t suggest he should be asked to.

The lack of receiving upside may not be a death-knell, because Etienne was a much better runner than most of those same critics predicted, (or would currently acknowledge). The big play ability paid off, highlighted by top-10 finishes in RYOE/A and Explosive run rate, but he was much more of an all around runner than given credit for, gaining more yards than expected on the 2nd highest percentage of his carries.

Notably, the Jaguars’ offensive line ranked dead last in PFF’s run block grades. Because the express goal of RYOEA/ROE% is to isolate the RB’s play from that of his offensive line, the fact Etienne is rated best in those metrics is a bullish sign in my opinion. However, despite this adverse environment, Etienne still ranked average or better in virtually every other advanced stat.

His PFF grade lagging his quantitative metrics is #OnBrand, but he doesn’t grade poorly. My film take on Etienne is that his mistakes are more obvious than most because he has poor ball security, and inconsistent hands. Couple that with his reputation as a boom or bust speed back from college and I think it’s assumed his instincts are bad. It was his first year playing NFL football and he was far from perfect. But I thought his decision-making was better than advertised overall, and his truly singular acceleration opens up more lanes than are available for most backs. I felt his largest issue as a runner was lack of power, which may be something we just have to live with as a trade off to his speed.

His struggles at the goal line have led many to question if Tank Bigsby will take on a short yardage specialist role this year, especially after that area was marked as a necessary improvement by the coaching staff. But as mentioned with Rhamondre Stevenson, I tend to trust the larger-sample stat of ROE% and success rates (especially when adjusted for his environmental context) more than the small snapshot of goal-line carries.

On that note, Bill Barnwell posted a thread of each of his goal-line failures today. At most, I see one diagnostic mistake by Etienne (he gets caught in no-man’s land on clip 1 — probably should have cut upfield immediately or stretched it, likely still stopped short). Every run is poorly blocked. I’m not sure it would be reasonable to expect Tank Bigsby or any non-elite tackle shedder to convert more of these looks.

Etienne is not without flaws. But the haste with which we rush out to define them is odd for a RB with 17 games of NFL experience and so many impressive qualities. As of today, Etienne hits top gear faster than any other high-volume RB in the NFL, and pairs this trump card trait with adequate results across the board, from tackle-breaking to success rates. When you consider he will only add experience and his blocking can only improve, it would not be a surprise if Etienne is one of the most impressive all-around rushers in the league in the coming years.

Add any improvement in the passing game to his rushing ceiling and existing screen-game profile, and Etienne could be a perennial RB1 with a comparable scoring profile Dalvin Cook, Jamaal Charles or Chris Johnson.

Etienne being available in late Round 4 is a perfect encapsulation of the way fantasy commentary has embraced high-value touch profiles: in my view too rigidly. His profile is almost identical to Antonio Gibson’s rookie year: efficient runner with gawdy athleticism, who lost pass-work and portions of short yardage to other backs. Gibson was drafted in the early-second by a fantasy community eager to project improvement onto him. We are giving Etienne no such benefit of the doubt, despite a far superior prospect foundation than Gibson had to stand on, and a more efficient first year altogether. A middle-ground ADP would be more reasonable.

Najee Harris

Depending who you ask, Najee Harris is a crappy plodder, a misunderstood genius, a talent-agnostic beneficiary of guaranteed volume, a midnight toker, or a space cowboy.

But after two years in the NFL we have a fairly good idea of who Najee Harris is on the field. He is above average at breaking tackles, and has the ability to sustain a substantial workload. The further you decouple any metric from measuring direct engagements with defenders, the worse Harris fairs. His decision-making is inconsistent, and his breakaway ability is non-existent. As a receiver, he’s good enough to remain on the field on every down a team wants him to, but he’s not adding value to your passing game.

We’ve seen this profile before and it’s a near carbon copy of David Montgomery.

Harris will always have the upside to finish as a mid-range RB1 because he has the rare ‘gas-like’ quality to fill as much space as provided to him. (i.e. get fed a shit load of touches) But this path typically requires a team forced to operate outside of their idealized offense, and for some favourable touchdown luck. As a base case, Harris projects as a high-end RB2 grinder back who is at consistent risk of losing his grip on the touches if a better alternative emerges in the eyes of the team.

It’s fair to project Harris to see a lot of work this year and across his career. He is a first round pick with the requisite size and competencies to sustain his current role for a long time. But you have to acknowledge you’re depending on a team operating based on your preferred or projected outcome, not necessarily the one which they are driven toward by the talent of the player.

Philosophically, I prefer to avoid backs with this type of profile, especially in this year’s draft environment. There is no shortage of projectable volume plays at more affordable prices than Harris’ mid-4th ADP. Dameon Pierce and Rachaad White spring to mind as analogous options. The only major difference between Harris and these players is the level of certainty the market has in the team preserving the status quo.

When I draft a Running Back, I want him to create so much inertia with the force of his play, his team has no choice but to feature his abilities. In years past, my analysis would stop here.

This year, some projectable volume plays have fallen to a point where I have to balance my desire to target uncertainty in roles, with an acknowledgement that my talent analysis is also uncertain.

However, I want to do this at the cheapest cost possible. That is not Najee Harris.

Harris is a polarizing player because the critical mass of drafters resistant to his profile pushes him into a range we rarely see backs of his pedigree fall in year 3. To his backers, we’re getting a massive discount on an established workhorse. For me, he’s the most expensive vessel for projectable volume. The category you put any player into is a reflection of the principles you emphasize in your analysis, and Harris sits at the nexus of our evolving market.

Ken Walker

Here’s the chart from the top of this section again so you don’t need to scroll.

Long time readers will recall I had a contrarian take on Ken Walker during last year’s draft cycle. While his last season at Michigan State was truly phenomenal, his career at Wake Forest prior to transferring was unimpressive both in terms of raw production and relative efficiency. I saw a player who was *likely* a great rusher, but almost certainly a non-pass catcher, while the market reflected he *WAS* a great rusher, who was *probably* a non-pass catcher.

Depending on what statistics you emphasize, my take on his rushing ability was either unnecessarily or correctly skeptical. There is no doubt Walker has special ability on the ground, combining elite tackle breaking ability with incredible breakaway speed. The fact he struggled in the one metric designed to capture both aspects of this (YAC/A) is a good reminder that these stats are ultimately descriptive of a snapshot of results from one season. You’d expect that to change based on his MTF/A and EXP%.

Walker’s “weakness” as a runner is behind the line of scrimmage. I thought both on his college and NFL tape he too often channelled the spirit of Leeroy Jenkins. Walker believes (fairly) he can hit the home run every play, and either consciously or unconsciously decides to forgo the two-four yards available to him within the play design to take the road less travelled in search of a long gain.

However, Walker has the requisite gifts to make this a net-positive approach. He wins engagements with defenders frequently, and has the speed and burst to maximize the chances his risk pays off with a massive run. This is reflected in high scores as an overall rusher despite such low success rates.

Due to his polarizing style, and net positive impact, I’ve labelled him the Adam Dunn of running backs.

I’m caught threading a fairly narrow needle here. As a writer who consistently preaches prioritizing impact of outcome above likelihood (and lifelong Adam Dunn apologist), I’m drawn to Ken Walker’s style of play. But I’ve also been hammering these weaknesses especially before they were as well publicized because coaches may not agree with me on the value of his style. The drafting of Zach Charbonnet brought this concern sharply into focus, but also priced it more fully into his ADP.

At his Round 5 ADP, Walker needs only to consolidate the entirety of his rushing work OR add pass catching: he doesn’t absolutely need both. Though at the same time, he probably needs both in order to make you truly regret passing on him.

I’ve been fading Walker most of the off-season because I see other options at similar costs who also profile as “great young rusher, add pass catching = major hit” who have more realistic pass catching upside and backfield competition I fear less. However, I fear this has been a convenient dose of whataboutism so I can keep fading a player I’ve always faded.

This may not be the data-driven analysis you come here for. But I just can’t shake the feeling that fading one of the most explosive ball carriers on Earth because of a rookie Joe Mixon impersonator will be punished by the Karma Police.

[I listened to seven hours of the Bandsplain podcast on Radiohead my last flight so I apologize for the three references in the last two articles]

Ken Walker represents a new form of talent debate in today’s world; one of style. Just years ago, the concept of using virtually any RB data beyond YPC was “advanced analytics.” Walker sits at an intriguing cross-roads between the ‘bet on talent’ aspect of RB evaluation that has gained increased influence in recent years, and the broader acceptance of more data that lead to debates about just how strong a bet Walker represents.

I firmly believe these micro-concerns separate Walker from, for example, Travis Etienne, or our next back. Thus, I do not think he is the best bet in this range, which makes him difficult to prioritize in draft structures, when I’m also trying to select several of the Round 2-3 RBs. But exaggerating my fade position on a player due to a preference of other options he is not correlated with is probably a flawed process, and I aim to mix Walker in more frequently over my remaining drafts.

JK Dobbins

I’ve already posted Dobbins’ 2022 stats above, but below are his combined rushing stats from 2020 and 2022. The “rank” is based on the hypothetical ranking of Dobbins’ combined metrics against the 2022 field.

Some caveats:

• Success Rates reflect 2022 only as FantasyPoints does not have that data available for 2020 (He ran 72 'man’ runs vs. just 20 zone runs)

• I used PFF’s calculation for EXP%, YAC/A and MTF/A in 2020 rather than FantasyPoints since it’s not in the database

The result is not substantially different from his 2022 table. But I wanted to illustrate this is not small-sample wizardry. Dobbins has performed as the most explosive RB in the NFL and one of the most efficient overall ever since entering the NFL, with stats only inclusive of his rookie season and an injured season.

There are some similarities between Dobbins and Etienne. Their overall efficiency is based primarily on explosive runs, while they are just average as tackle breakers. Additionally, both are judged more favourably by quantitative data than PFF’s film grade. What excites me about Dobbins is the chance to bet on an extremely bullish statistical profile at a very affordable cost in Round 6, and do it on a player who has the pedigree to back up his stats. Dobbins was considered by data and film-based analysts alike one of the best backs in the loaded 2020 class, and was drafted accordingly in the second round.

As I wrote earlier this off-season, the three things holding Dobbins back from turning his real-life abilities into fantasy success have been receiving work / skill, health, and coaching tendencies.

At least two of those are favourites to change in 2023. Now two years removed from his ACL injury, and having reported to camp following his contract-related absence, Dobbins enters this season as a healthy, entrenched starting running back for the first time in his NFL career.

Greg Roman was able to design an efficient run game for Baltimore the past two years, but given the talent of Dobbins and the threat posed by Lamar Jackson, I suspect they’ll manage well without him. What won’t be missed is Roman’s tendency to rotate running backs relentlessly and throw to them at league-low rates in the passing game.

There may be room for optimism on this front. As I posted in an earlier article, new play caller Todd Monken’s Georgia offense from 2020-2022 also featured a mobile quarterback in Stetson Bennett; though nobody would mistake him for Lamar Jackson. Nonetheless, the percentage of receptions to running backs in those three years was 19%, 23% and 19% respectively.

During that same three-year period, Baltimore’s offense under Greg Roman threw to backs 16%, 16% and 18% of the time.

Most encouragingly, Monken has been willing to use an elite rusher as an all-purpose back as an NFL play-caller. Nick Chubb set a career-high in targets (49), receptions (36), and receiving yards (278) in his lone season with Monken as offensive coordinator.

Of the two avenues for positive change in Baltimore’s RB rotations I have more faith in Dobbins’ ability to consolidate rushing snaps. Presumed RB2 Gus Edwards has posted strong efficiency results in his career, but is an unheralded back who is one-dimensional, and entering his Age-28 season. Edwards has been the more consistent back relative to Dobbins while trading that off with a lack of explosiveness. His best ability is getting downhill in a hurry, a key attribute in Roman’s system which prioritized a combination of horizontal motion and lead blockers to set up power-runs down hill vs. leveraged defenders. The Monken scheme will likely play less directly to Edwards’ strengths, and into Dobbins’ more versatile hands.

The ‘Gus Bus’ has played behind Justice Hill at times this pre-season, making the RB rotation behind Dobbins even more ambiguous than assumed. It’s hard to project a high number of RB carries when carving out designed rushes for Lamar Jackson and buying Monkens’ desire to pass more frequently. But if they switch to a one-back system, Dobbins could consolidate up to 275 carries if his RB rush share approaches 75%.

In my projections, I afforded him with just 220 carries (65% of RB rushes) and still have him projecting for nearly 15 PPG. Part of this is my TD expectancy for the Ravens offense which I suspect will be among the league’s best in all phases after adding effectively three starting WRs compared to last year’s unit, and upgrading their play caller. The other aspect is projecting a significant growth in target share…

There is no evidence JK Dobbins is a fantastic pass catcher, nor did he profile to be as un-involved as he’s been thus far. His college YPRR was 1.00 for his career with a best season mark of 1.17. For context this puts him above Zach Charbonnet, Tank Bigsby, and Roschon Johnson in this year’s class: all backs discussed as possible passing down options. His peak Market Share of Receiving Yards was 6.7%, a less impressive figure, but should be granted some context points given the electricity of the Buckeyes passing game. If you want to put on rose coloured glasses, I’d point to a 67th percentile college ADOT and a 7.7 college YPT as signs he can produce efficiently, and on a more developed route tree than most backs.

Dobbins’ NFL sample as a pass catcher is fairly bleak. His 2022 season featured only eight total targets, and his 2020 season featured a PFF receiving grade and YPRR near the bottom of the league.

I think his range of outcomes likely precludes any hidden, elite pass-catching upside. But taking the long view on his college profile and factoring in the Greg Roman effect, I think it’s at least possible he is a viable enough pass catcher that the team prefers to use him in all situations rather than subbing him on and off with Justice Hill.

Overall, the talent case for Dobbins is quite strong relative to his cost. At base, he’s the clear lead back among a rotation who should project for high-end efficiency and a strong TD rate. With nothing added except good health, this probably makes him a neutral pick in Round six, a la Miles Sanders from 2022. If we add even three targets per game (I have him projected for 3.3), this could be enough for Dobbins to finish as a low-end RB1. If the increase in rushing share and passing volume hit at once, we could be talking about one of the biggest steals in the draft.

James Cook

Here comes the Chart again because I keep writing too many words to expect you to scroll up. James Cook’s context-free analytics make him look like one of the best running backs in the league. Therefore, the rest of this section is devoted to putting context around those numbers and letting you decide if his current cost bakes enough of that context into his profile.

The first nugget of context is that James Cook doesn’t actually hit my 90 attempt cut off. That’s why both he and Dobbins are ranked 1st in EXP%, since Cook’s number isn’t counted in Dobbins’ ranking. The 90 attempt threshold is based on the threshold NextGenStats uses since I employ their metrics, rather than an arbitrary number chosen to exclude James Cook. This context is especially key, because Cook’s top-ranked RYOE/A is based on a calculation from a different site without access to player-tracking data. I wouldn’t ignore it, and commend Tej Seth immensely for trying to build a viable model with public data, but I am more confident in the NGS model.

Not only did Cook have few attempts, but he had a favourable deployment, facing the 63rd-ranked average defenders in the box, per PlayerProfiler. Similar to our discussion around D’Andre Swift, Cook’s usage allowed him to essentially catch defenses sleeping while expecting the pass. He often received carries out of passing formations, and was given higher upside runs such as stretches and sweeps. If you project Cook to become a 200+ carry RB, most of the additional carries will be standard runs vs. balanced defenses.

Nonetheless, Cook is verifiably explosive, an efficient and strongly graded pass catcher, and has at least given us some evidence of an upside rushing efficiency profile. Now being discussed as the clear lead back in Buffalo, shouldn’t we be willing to take a shot on his upside?

At his original ADP in the late 8th, simply being “the lead back” would be enough to pay off. But at his rising cost into the 6th round (or even fifth on high stakes sites), you need either borderline-workhorse volume, or truly elite pass-game usage within his range of outcomes to offer a ceiling worth drafting, to materially exceed his cost.

To this point, across four years in college and his rookie season in the NFL, he has shown no indication that he can merit either.

Cook’s college profile is a microcosm of his rookie year. He posted a cumulative YPRR of 1.95 which is quite impressive. However, his peak season market share of receiving yards was just 7.52% — roughly average among NFL drafted RBs. He simply never ran a high volume of routes. His career high was 168, which was accomplished in 2021 with the benefit of Georgia playing three post-season games. He ran just 200 routes total in three previous seasons. Cook was also used in pass-protection on just 47 college snaps, something which carried over to his rookie season.

A misconception some fantasy players have with receiving backs is assuming they will immediately play passing downs. Sometimes, the most dynamic receiving backs are undersized playmakers who are unproven in pass protection. Early in their NFL careers, their pass-game usage is restrained more to early downs and schemed touches, while a more reliable outlet back plays in LDD situations, capping their upside. Cook fell into this category in 2022, with Devin Singletary serving as the primary LDD back.

With respect to Cook’s rushing profile, he never saw more than 25.4% of this team’s carries. To be fair, he played in talented college backfields, sharing primarily with Zamir White in his late career. But there is little reason to think White is a more challenging threat to Cook on early downs than most replacement-level NFL early-down backs, such as Damien Harris or Latavius Murray. Cook was more efficient than White at Georgia on his carries, but speaking to his limited use-case, had a lower success rate compared to White and the rest of his teammates over the duration of his college career. This was exacerbated when Cook was asked to carry the ball against heavier boxes, which he avoided in 2022.

I’ve made it this far without mention of James Cook’s size. He weighed in at 199 pounds at the NFL combine, but is currently listed at 5-10, 190 on the Bills website. Frankly, size is not my primary concern here. If a back has a history of earning volume and performing on it, I trust they can continue doing so if given the opportunity. If a back can demonstrate efficiency on a small dose of carries, but do it on a wide variety of run-types against typical box counts, I’m inclined to say they warrant a chance to upgrade their workload.

I think James Cook is a talented and explosive playmaker who can add a dimension to their offense both as a pass catcher and an outside rushing presence they sorely lacked in the rest of the Josh Allen-era trotting out the SingleMoss twins. If the Bills decide this element is worth sacrificing consistency on traditional runs, and/or pass blocking ability, I frankly applaud them. Noah Hills posted a clip in his article of Ken Dorsey discussing the benefit of using a player like Cook in an every-down role instead of in specialized situations to keep a defense honest. I’m just hesitant to fully believe them.

It’s possible I’m scarred from a lifetime of fruitlessly begging NFL teams to use their explosive young RBs more and their preferred retread plodders less. But the history of NFL RB usage suggests that an undersized RB is more likely to have touches they would likely perform well on given elsewhere, than have touches they likely won’t perform well on stuffed in their lap.

Do you remember Duke Johnson? The poster boy for efficient satellite back the NFL would never “free?” Duke Johnson’s career low rush attempts in a college season was 139. Between High School, Georgia, and the NFL, James Cook has never met that bar.

At this point, Cook is a long way from demonstrating the type of rushing versatility of a Tony Pollard, the best recent example of an undersized back with limited college volume who worked his way into an RB1 fantasy role. His profile lacks the every-down collegiate volume of future undersized RB1s Austin Ekeler, Christian McCaffrey, Jamaal Charles, Aaron Jones, Chris Johnson, C.J. Spiller, Reggie Bush, LeSean Mccoy, or even Philip Lindsay and Giovanni Bernard.

Dig even further down the list of undersized RB1 finishers in the last decade and you keep seeing the same pattern. Darren Sproles and Tarik Cohen combine for just one season with fewer college carries than James Cook’s career high. Did you know Danny freakin’ Woodhead ran for over 7,400 collegiate yards?

James White may be the best comparison for the man he shares a first name with in this ilk. Like Cook, he played in a competitive college running back room at Wisconsin, sharing the load with Melvin Gordon and Corey Clement. Similar to Cook, his receiving production was muted in college for his first three seasons, before a semi-breakout with an 11.7% market share in year four. However, even White posted a higher number of carries in every single college season than Cook had in his best, and White was sparsely used as a rusher even at his fantasy peak.

You’ll know from my love of De’Von Achane, Khalil Herbert, Tony Pollard and others that I’m not an analyst who rules out the possibility of backs outperforming the expectations of their size, or scaling their efficiency on greater volume. Frankly, I’m rooting for James Cook to prove me wrong and open new doors for different RB archetypes to succeed in this league. But I feel a lot more comfortable making bets on outliers when there is something in the profile to latch onto beyond coach speak.

Tying this back to our meta-conversation, Cook superficially fits the mold of a back worth targeting as our game changes. He’s ascending, explosive, efficient, and provides his best value in the passing game. He presents as the type of ‘bet on talent, and bet into role uncertainty’ play I typically preach. However, I fear this argument is rather shallow the deeper you dig.

I earnestly believe Cook will be the most important Running Back on the Buffalo Bills in 2023. What I don’t suspect is that Cook excels in elements of the game he’s never been used in and never performed well in. As a result, I suspect a team with Cook-as-lead-back means a committee approach with Cook as the head, and complimentary option(s) to take on some or most of the short yardage rushing, pass protection, and complimentary early down rushing work. Such a result would preclude Cook from possessing the type of upside he needs at his rising price.

In the end, I don’t think anything is impossible — most of all young, exciting players adding to their skillsets. But Cook does not present the strongest bet to provide a true breakout season from the middle rounds.

The “Competition”

I hope this doesn’t read like whiplash, going back and forth between backfields. But in hopes of this being more a meta piece I wanted to break up the bets by component rather than player. We’ll go back through each backfield and add to our talent assessment of each player by adding more environmental context.

Jacksonville Jaguars — Tank Bigsby, JaMychal Hasty

I’ve written about Tank Bigsby several times. But I addressed him most thoroughly in this piece, both in the introduction and again in his section of the walkthrough.

Bigsby combined a serviceable 8.69% college receiving market share with an equally serviceable 52.4% rushing market share, a 210-pound frame and the name, “Tank,” to resemble an every down running back. His efficiency profile was less impressive than his volume profile, with just a 0.86 YPRR and generally less efficiency and consistency per carry than his teammates.

My film take on Tank Bigsby was pretty optimistic. I thought he demonstrated the impressive open-field power and innate change-of-direction skills to be a productive zone-system running back if he was placed in a better environment than his mess of a college offense, and was taught to make better decisions behind the line of scrimmage. By all reports, he’s been excelling in training camp, and I think he’s an excellent stylistic fit for Pederson’s offense.

I wish I could embed specific plays from twitter, but I encourage you to watch this cut-up from Zareh Kantzabedian.

I’ll call your attention to play #2: it’s an outside run where Bigsby runs patiently behind a pulling lead blocker and navigates his linemen well for a chunk gain. This was a nice bit of patient running that shows he has a better understanding of the offense now than he often had at Auburn. Play #3 once again shows Bigsby operating in rhythm, and he makes a well-timed jump cut to produce a successful run. Play #6 is similar: Bigsby waits for a hole to develop, makes a great cut and shoots through it for a chunk run. This level of consistency behind the line of scrimmage is major progress for him compared to Auburn.

Step 1: hide behind your lineman, diagnose a lane

Step 2: work through the gap

Step 3: run to daylight

Play #4 is my favourite Bigsby run and it shows off the change of direction in isolated engagements with defenders that made me swoon over him at Auburn.

Bigsby receives the handoff and has a clear hole outside the tackles, but faces immediate penetration in the backfield.

At this point he’s stutter stepped around tackler 1, but needs get around tackler 2 (his most immediate defender) without ceding the edge to #79. He draws both in by pressing this run close to the defenders before cutting outside.

By drawing in the defenders, he sets himself up with the angle to beat #79 to the edge. He later wins the edge completely (with the help of some nice blocking by WR Tim Jones) and creates a big gain.

Having watched him this pre-season, I’m legitimately excited that Bigsby has translated my favourite attributes of his college tape, and is already showing progress on his weaknesses. The Jaguars plan to get him involved in their offense immediately makes sense.

All that being said, Bigsby is not the explosive threat Travis Etienne is, and it will take more than a couple pre-season games for me to proclaim he’s a more consistent rusher after what we saw from Etienne in his first season. I’m currently excited about drafting both backs at their respective costs given the talent I see in each and the upside of this offense.

The primary concern to both is JaMychal Hasty. He is no threat to either’s role in the running game (just 9 snaps with the ‘first-team’ out of 46 total plays in two weeks), but he has subbed in for LDD work. If this continues, it would be a legitimate downgrade to the upside of Etienne (and Bigsby). My hope is that with Bigsby’s emergence, the team sees an opportunity to be more versatile by playing a legitimate threat out of the backfield on every down with possible exception of some 3rd and 10+ situations. If they rotate Etienne and Bigsby, you don’t need to overload either, which displaces the ‘comparative advantage theory’ of LDD work: (teams deciding they need to give their RB a break somewhere, and choosing LDD situations by default).

For what it’s worth, Hasty’s role mostly emerged after James Robinson was phased out last year. The team never operated as a full blown three back committee, and teams rarely do. My projection is they open the season with Etienne taking the vast majority of early down snaps, and Tank Bigsby mixing in on occasion with Hasty playing obvious passing downs. My hope is that over the course of the season, Etienne and Bigsby show enough for this committee to evolve into a more situationally-agnostic rotation in which Etienne plays two drives to Bigsby’s one, with some flexibility if the latter is running especially well.

It’s possible they see Hasty as a major upgrade in passing situations, but both Etienne and Bigsby have enough pedigree in every down roles from college that I think you’re giving back more by swapping out your personnel than you may theoretically gain. Doug Pederson has always ran his teams at a fast-pace. If I use Etienne or Bigsby in 11-personnel to convert a third-and-five, first of all I force the defense to respect the possibility I audible into a run if they don’t respect it. Then, if I convert, I can come out and run the ball immediately without allowing the defense to substitute from their passing down package.

I’m a big believer in remaining as unpredictable as possible with your running backs to avoid tipping plays, and I think they have the running back talent in this room to concentrate usage on these two ascending talents.

Pittsburgh Steelers — Jaylen Warren, Anthony McFarland

Anthony McFarland has been in Pittsburgh for several years and never played a legitimate role, so for all intents and purposes Jaylen Warren is the only name to consider here.

Is he Tony Pollard 2.0?

The reverse side of pounding the table that one can like Travis Etienne and Tank Bigsby at the same time, is my assertion one can think Najee Harris is mediocre without accepting Jaylen Warren as my lord and saviour.

The 2022 un-drafted free agent exceeded all expectations as a rookie, claiming the number two role and offering value on passing downs. His rushing totals come in below my thresholds, but on a per-carry basis he was substantially more efficient than Harris, even after adjusting for his facing much lighter box counts.

I’ve seen some folks dismiss Warren due to his inefficient college profile (4.8 yards per carry in his breakout season), UDFA status, and the fact his carries were perceived to be disproportionately against defenses taking a breather. I think this is both fair and unfair.

On one hand, Warren averaged 1.84 yards prior to contact, compared to just 1.12 for Harris. Some of that can be credited to Harris’ inability to avoid tacklers (he posted a below average ROE% and success rate). But the majority of that is Warren running on easy-mode. That being said, he still posted an impressive 0.25 MTF/A and 3.08 YAC/A, both strong marks among NFL backs and both superior scores to Najee Harris. On the sample he was given, he created his own efficiency. He also has a 215-pound frame and a 256 carry season on his college resume, making me more optimistic he can sustain these attributes on increased volume than the conversation we just had about James Cook. His college profile was underrated. Oklahoma State had a deeply inefficient offense, but Warren was the most effective of their rushing options.

Expecting Warren to be the type of talent necessary to completely take the job is premature. But expecting him to be a sufficient alternative to take on an increased portion of carries if they fall out of love with Najee Harris is reasonable.

In the pre-season, Warren has been used similarly to the back-half of last year. He plays routinely in LDD situations, and occasionally remains on the field for a rushing series to follow. He housed a spectacular 62-yard TD run in one such situation in the most recent game.

In terms of his LDD profile, I see no reason why Warren would cede those touches back to Harris. Warren posted the fourth highest receiving grade in the league last year and 19th-ranked YPRR of 1.24 — both far superior to Harris. His college profile (1.01 YPRR // 6.9% Receiving Yards Market Share) suggested at least baseline competence as a receiver, which has only improved since arriving in the league.

Overall, I don’t expect Warren to take the job from Harris and would be leery of projecting our dislike of Harris into overrating Warren’s talent. But he has already carved out a role, and displays no reason why that role should decrease. This is a concern for the volume-dependent Harris’s upside, but also speaks bullishly to Warren’s contingent value. If Harris were to get injured, Warren finds himself as a 215-pound back with pass-down ability and no viable alternative on the depth chart. He is one of the highest-upside contingent value backs you can find in drafts.

Seattle Seahawks — Zach Charbonnet, Deejay Dallas / Kenny McIntosh

It’s truly striking how similar the Jaguars and Seahawks running back rooms are. Like Jacksonville, the Seahawks supplemented their ascendent, explosive young runner with a jack-of-all trades type in Zach Charbonnet, while carrying over a looming LDD threat to both. Because Walker has yet to play in the pre-season, we have even less of a read on how the work will be distributed.

I wrote about Charbonnet for the first time in my pre-draft rankings. I like his player archetype quite a bit, combining a 214-pound frame with a 9.3% receiving yards market share. He fits the mold of back who never has to be taken off the field when given an opportunity. That being said, there is nothing spectacular or explosive in his rushing profile, nor was he an especially efficient receiver (Career YPRR of 0.86).

For that reason, I think it’s primarily Walker who will dictate the direction of this backfield. His explosiveness will lock him into a substantial role, while the degree of his improvement in his weaknesses (rushing consistency, short yardage, passing downs) will determine what areas Charbonnet has a residual advantage. At the very least, Charbonnet’s contingent upside is incredibly appealing.

In limited pre-season usage, Walker rested, and Charbonnet split with DeeJay Dallas — in particular on passing downs. I am skeptical this will carry over into the regular season. Ken Walker began gaining on Dallas (and Homer) in routes over the back-half of the season despite putrid results. Between that evidence, and the second-round pick spent on Charbonnet to supplement Walker, I suspect the LDD join will either be Charbonnet’s or shared between Walker and Charbonnet in a situation-agnostic rotation by mid-season at the latest.

Baltimore Ravens — Gus Edwards / Justice Hill / Melvin Gordon / Keaton Mitchell

The Ravens’ pre-season usage has been hard to make much sense of thus far. JK Dobbins has rested throughout, and Gus Edwards did not play in the most recent game despite being in full uniform. In the first game, Justice Hill started the game instead of Edwards.

As mentioned in the Dobbins section, Edwards has been a value adding RB every year he’s been healthy. But he adds absolutely zero passing game value, and has a unique running style that fit like a glove in Roman’s system. It would not surprise me if Todd Monken wants a more diverse set of skills from his backs, or if Edwards efficiency fades with age and a new system. Justice Hill was an athletic and exciting college prospect who has mostly been contained to a passing down role in the NFL. He seems legitimately live for the backup job, and is definitely live to play passing downs instead of Dobbins (despite my optimism to the contrary).

I don’t see anyone in this backfield as the same level of threat discussed with each of the backs above, nor do I see them as the same level of contingent bet. Justice Hill would likely require an early down complement and Gus Edwards would absolutely require a passing down companion in the event either is the primary backup and Dobbins suffers an injury. Melvin Gordon had an argument for worst back in the league last year, has been buried with the backups in pre-season action and appears to be fighting for a roster spot with UDFA Keaton Mitchell.

Buffalo Bills — Damien Harris / Latavius Murray

Damien Harris was a conviction play for me in best ball to start the off-season, because I’ve always liked the talent, and am relatively bearish on James Cook. The momentum on this has been admittedly negative ever since he signed, as he’s dealt with injuries and is supposedly locked in a dead-heat with Latavius Murray for the backup job.

Harris has posted 0.29 or more RYOE/A the past three years, and has been above 40 in ROE% in each. He has consistently ran well even as he was overtaken by the more versatile Rhamondre Stevenson last year. Latavius Murray was less impressive, but posted league average results as a get-what’s-blocked banger in Denver.

Harris was not used as a pass catcher often in New England but it’s worth noting that in the last two years he’s posted a YPRR of 1.01 and 1.12. It’s not as though he has hands of stone out there. Latavius Murray also has a history of playing passing down snaps at least occasionally across all his NFL stops save for Baltimore. If the Bills don’t want James Cook as their primary pass protector, they have options. If Cook were to get hurt, I don’t have much of a read on who plays passing down snaps but would give a soft edge to Murray based on his greater experience.

I’ve discussed how team off-season moves don’t necessarily add up to in-season usage, because sometimes they speak only to insurance policies. I think that’s a fair assessment here. If Cook is everything the Bills dreamed of, neither Harris nor Murray necessitates major usage. But the Bills did protect themselves with two backs who are able to fill in for Cook if his question mark areas surface in the regular season.

Projected and Contingent Usage

Jacksonville Jaguars

• Primary Rushing: Travis Etienne

• Secondary Rushing: Tank Bigsby

• Goal-Line: Split — Etienne and Bigsby. (NOTE: While Bigsby received the the 3rd and 1 heard ‘round the world, Etienne was on the field for a snap from the three-yard line. I discussed their goal-line usage more here)

• LDD: Likely Hasty to start, expecting a shift toward Etienne and Bigsby taking turns by drive by mid-season

• Two-Min Drill: Primarily Etienne since pass-protection responsibilities are often of less importance, possibility of Hasty.

NOTE: should either back suffer an injury I expect Hasty to play sparingly, but more than anyone wants based on what we saw last year.

Pittsburgh Steelers

• Primary Rushing: Najee Harris

• Secondary Rushing: Jaylen Warren

• Goal-Line: Najee Harris

• LDD: Jaylen Warren

• Two-Min Drill: Jaylen Warren

NOTE: Should either back suffer an injury, I expect the other to dominate snaps

Seattle Seahawks

• Primary Rushing: Ken Walker

• Secondary Rushing: Zach Charbonnet

• Goal-Line: Split, Charbonnet may increase over time. (NOTE: while Etienne’s goal-line struggles, Walker faired similarly, but his struggles are backed up by profile-wide consistency issues in a way Etienne’s are not)

• LDD: Split b/w Walker and Charbonnet by drive (don’t have a good read on this for the early season but this is my expectation by mid-season, if not all Charbonnet)

• Two-Min Drill: Hard to say here. I think by mid-season this is Charbonnet’s job but could see any of the top-three backs getting it in Week 1

Baltimore Ravens

• Primary Rushing: JK Dobbins

• Secondary Rushing: Gus Edwards (tentatively)

• Goal-Line: JK Dobbins primarily, Edwards remains on to finish his drives

• LDD: JK Dobbins OR Justice Hill (View this as a borderline coin flip)

• Two-Min Drill: Same as above, but maybe a better shot we get Dobbins here

Buffalo Bills

• Primary Rushing: James Cook, but closer to 50/50

• Secondary Rushing: Damien Harris vs. Latavius Murray (I still expect Harris to win this battle)

• Goal-Line: Damien Harris (but see this as a legitimate three-way battle)

• LDD: James Cook (tentatively)

• Two-Min Drill: James Cook (less tentatively)

Takeaways — The Big Picture

This piece was unique from most of my Hitchhiker pieces in format, because I wanted to say something bigger. Here is where I try.

There are infinite ways the fantasy community has changed in recent years. When it comes to RBs I see a few major ones:

• We are increasingly willing to ‘bet on talent’ and increasingly able to define it

• We are increasingly able to articulate more nuanced analyses of volume to break it down into high value touches, and contingent value

• We are increasingly drafting WRs: pushing RBs as a group down draft boards

The reason I see these backs as uniquely indicative of the dead zone in this ‘information age’ are that each represents a new type of bet created by one or more of those factors.

We never used to see Najee Harrises fall to this point in drafts. In part because of position-wide trends, but in part because we are more alert to his talent deficiencies. By the same token, we never used to have so many similar projectable volume options available at cheaper costs.

Backs like Travis Etienne and Ken Walker would in past years see most question marks in their profile resolved positively in search of the next big thing at RB. Think of how we treated Antonio Gibson, Cam Akers, or Miles Sanders following their rookie years compared to how we view Etienne and Walker. These two sit at a cross-roads between a systemic bet on talent, and a concern over the nuances in their talent and/or high-value touch profile. I contend that a deeper view into the specifics of their profile reveals these bets are not quite as similar as they appear.

James Cook presents a collision of the macro and micro. It’s not surprising he is a player I’ve experienced the most disagreement about with people I normally agree with quite a lot. Depending on your view, he is either an ascendant talent in all the ways that matter, how is being undervalued because of people’s concerns about his role: your prototypical dead zone target. For others, he represents a bet on projectable volume due to coach speak that runs against the fundamentals of his profile. In my view, he represents the dangers of drafting heuristically no matter which camp you fall into. I’ve explained my perspective on why I think he is somewhat of a trap for those over-extending a lot of positive signals onto him, but I’m legitimately fascinated to see how this ends up: he strikes me as a truly unique bet.

JK Dobbins perhaps represents that I can’t simply sort a bunch of individual players into a series of boxes or Radiohead metaphors and call it a complete work of analysis. Is he a classic dead zone back with limited pass game appeal and an absence of backups? Or is he a special talent priced down by injuries and uncertainty? Maybe nobody is just one thing. Dobbins demands us to view him in and his cost in isolation, and in my opinion, he appears a stronger bet the more you open yourself up to him.

The influx of valuable analysis pulls us into more different directions than Atilla. The result is different plains of drafters following several different heuristics to wildly different takeaways. My hope with this column is to provide an open-minded, thorough picture on each player, and form a well-reasoned chain of analysis from which you can choose what you wish to value. I hope from this piece you walk away with a deeper understanding of each back, and how they may factor into your middle-round game plan.

Takeaways — My Desired Market Position

TRAVIS ETIENNE: Target in all seasonal formats, neutral in dynasty

TANK BIGSBY: Target in all formats

NAJEE HARRIS: Fade in all formats

JAYLEN WARREN: Target in seasonal formats, ambivalent in dynasty

KEN WALKER: Soft-fade in seasonal formats, most interested in best ball. Fade in dynasty

ZACH CHARBONNET: Target in all seasonal formats, soft-fade in dynasty due to cost

JK DOBBINS: Priority target in all formats

GUS EDWARDS / JUSTICE HILL: Fine dynasty stashes, reasonable seasonal last-round picks, prefer Hill in best ball

JAMES COOK: Fading in all formats (at new cost), but admittedly don’t love it

DAMIEN HARRIS / LATAVIUS MURRAY: Targeting Harris as he slides, Murray rotating into my last round options, stashing both on dynasty benches

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Metrics Legend:

RYOE/A = Rush Yards over Expectation per Attempt (NFL Next Gen Stats)

ROE% = Percentage of Rushes over Expectation (NFL Next Gen Stats)

BAE Rating = Box-Adjusted Efficiency Rating, A box-count weighted efficiency metric comparing a RB vs. his teammates created by Noah Hills

RSR = Relative Success Rate, a metric created by Noah Hills to measure a running back’s rate of successful carries vs. that of their team-mates

YAC/A = Yards After Contact per Attempt

YBC/A = Yards Before Contact per Attempt

PFF Grade / PFF Rushing Grade = Qualitative Film Grade assigned by Pro Football Focus

Juke Rate: PlayerProfiler’s tackle avoidance metric, combining both broken tackles and evaded tackles

EXP%: Percentage of rushes of 15+ yards

YPRR: Yards per Route Run

TPRR: Targets per Route Run

HVT: High Value Touches (receptions and goal-line carries)