HHG Part 3: Fragile Backfields

Can you breathe life into the back half of 2023's RB Dead Zone?

On and on the rain will fall, like tears from a star. On and on the rain will say, how fragile projectable volume RBs are.

People forget that Sting was the first Zero-RB influencer.

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Welcome in to the third edition of the off-season Hitchhiker’s guide where we sort through every RB in the streaming galaxy in excruciating detail.

If you haven’t checked out the first edition which outlines some of the basic principles of the column and covers the Eagles and Saints three-headed backfields; you can find that here. You can find the rest of my analysis on the NFL’s most ambiguous backfields with this piece on the Dolphins and Bears.

Thinking About Thinking readers should at this point be familiar my ‘Running Backs as Balloons’ frame of analysis, that relies heavily on considerations of comparative advantage, talent-first backfield analysis, and prioritizing contingent value profiles.

A theme of the last two posts was pointing out which backs offered a ‘trump card’ skill that insulated their usage in some aspect of the game, and which backs had the residual skills to offer upside beyond their projection.

Today’s post, and the ones to follow are much the opposite.

Most of the backfields we discuss involve a starter of average or unproven talent surrounded by unheralded backups. While at any period of time, a running back need only be better than the alternatives, the appeal of a profile who is both at risk their role diminishing in the event of any negative externality and projected close to their ceiling is limited.

In fact, this was effectively the thesis of the Hitchhiker’s Guide Column.

In the event the RBs discussed today perform in line with their ADP (as low-end RB2s or high-end RB3s) they will likely score between 11-13 PPG. In last year’s column, we streamed the RB22 — 12.4 PPG — using a weekly score averaged between one of the late-round fliers we designated pre-season, and two waiver-eligible players each week. We should note that our rules precluded us from picking up a player from waivers and continuing to start them in future weeks unless their rostership remained below 67%. Therefore, we could not derive the full benefit from players such as Latavius Murray, Jamaal Williams, or Jerick McKinnon who provided sustained stretches of starting production that others may have enjoyed.

There are no shortage of options to backfill replacement level production at the RB2 position each year via late round picks and the waiver wire.

Latavius Murray provided a 12-game stretch of 11.7 PPG after signing with Denver, and increased his output to 12.2 PPG after Melvin Gordon was released.

D’Onta Foreman produced 11.6 PPG over an 11-game stretch after Christian McCaffrey was traded away.

Jeff Wilson Jr. provided two stints of 11.2 PPG (5 games) and 10.5 PPG (8 games — including one departed with an injury) with two teams.

Jerick McKinnon produced 18.6 PPG over the final seven games of 2023 after Clyde Edwards-Hellaire suffered an injury.

Samaje Perine provided two games at 20.4 PPG without Joe Mixon.

Eno Benjamin gave you 13.8 PPG in three spot starts for James Conner.

Several other one-off streamers, combined with late-round options such as Jamaal Williams, James Robinson, and Raheem Mostert combined to cobble together our stream score which matched the expected production of the lead backs we discuss today.

Had we done the off-season version of this column last year, today’s article likely would have featured the following group of backs:

• Cam Akers

• David Montgomery

• Elijah Mitchell

• Josh Jacobs

• Clyde Edwards-Hellaire

• Miles Sanders

• Chase Edmonds

• Dameon Pierce

• Antonio Gibson

Josh Jacobs stands out as a massive success story (RB3 — 19.3 PPR PPG), but the rest of this group consists of either mild hits (Miles Sanders — RB21, Dameon Pierce — RB20), mild losses (David Montgomery — RB27, Antonio Gibson — RB29) or downright disasters (Akers, Mitchell, Edwards-Hellaire, Edmonds).

Outside of Jacobs, the major hits which defined the middle-rounds at Running Back came from historically stronger bets in this price range; a rookie back in Ken Walker (RB16), and two mid-round bets on talent being drafted second in their backfield (Rhamondre Stevenson — RB10, Tony Pollard — RB8).

I wrote about the oddity of Josh Jacobs’ season last year; both in terms of its unpredictable nature, and the outsized negative market sentiment that has been attached to Jacobs over the course of his career.

I encourage you to check that piece out, but to synthesize the “lesson” of Josh Jacobs and 2022’s running back middle rounds generally I would say this:

1. Josh Jacobs’s 2022 season was not a likely outcome, nor was it indicative of a league-wide shift in the type of profile worth targeting in the middle rounds of drafts.

2. While no other middle-round RB approached the level of success Jacobs had, historically preferable bets — rookies and young players, and those priced in this range due to a combination of talent and role ambiguity — remained successful and remain preferable bets to RBs priced up due primarily to projectable volume.

3. When a player (such as Jacobs last year) is priced inefficiently relative to where that profile is drafted historically and/or other similar profiles, it provides an opportunity to take what the market gives us rather than remaining dogmatic in the face of changes to the market dynamics. Remember, ADP-trend analysis without consideration of the underlying inputs behind each fade and target risks losing its signal if the market elements which produced those trends shift dramatically.

Turning to the backs we will discuss over the next couple articles, each falls is a historically questionable bet; at least in a vacuum. There are several takes on the running back dead zone, but I will always link first to Ben Gretch’s 2019 piece because it introduced the concept and hits on a ‘wisdom of the crowds’ element I think is often under-discussed. I will also link to my piece because well, it’s mine.

To synthesize my thoughts:

The strongest bets in the middle rounds are those whose ADP represents an equilibrium between the upward pressure of their talent, and the downward pressure of concerns regarding their role, health, or offensive environment.

The weakest bets in the middle rounds are those whose ADP represents the point at which the upward pressure of the RBs’ projectable volume, renders them the most viable pick after all other similarly projected backs with superior talent have been drafted.

So does that mean every RB we talk about is destined for failure? Of course not. The key to this pre-amble was to centre our analysis to assess each player from an offensive rather than defense frame of mind. Rather than fearing “stolen” touches, or celebrating a bounty of available touches, we should be making the case for each back not in terms of “how can they fail?” but “how can they smash?”

If the best version of your team involves replacement level production out of the RB2 slot, it is best you find that as cheaply as possible to maximize the capital put into the rest of your lineup. Otherwise, you are paying to know who your RB2 is rather than for for a material increase in your win equity. The question for each of these RBs today is: what is necessary for them to break beyond replacement level production and what traits do they have that supports their ceiling case? AND; has the market priced them affordably enough that there is a greater edge to be gained from their median case than historically similar options?

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There is no perfect categorization method to determine a “fragile” starter. But the commonalities between each of these backs are:

A) None have a backup who is drafted until the late rounds of drafts (if at all)

B) None are priced down due to an injury or holdout concern

C) Each back has a plausible path to an every-down role

Essentially, everything you could want in a backfield situation, these guys have in their favour. Yet they are all drafted in Rounds 5-7…

Let’s get into it.